Fact-Checking/ Report Disinformation/ Quality Label

General description
 * The digital transformation of news media and the rise of disinformation and fake news (2018) : Fact-checking has often been proposed as a solution to bridge the information asymmetry between consumers and news providers. Fact-checking only applies to the narrow definition of verifiable false news; it does not address the wider concerns about the quality of online news. Fact-checkers can signal suspicious content to editors who review "flagged" content and possibly remove it or mark it as potentially false news.
 * (Ecker, U. et al. (2022)) "Debunking emphasizes responding to specific misinformation after exposure to demonstrate why it is false."
 * (Belgian Senate (2021)) Journalists are well-equipped to tackle disinformation. They are highly trusted. They have a deontological duty to check the veracity of their information; fact-checking is an important element of this deontology. Journalism professional ethics are checked by independent, self-regulating organisations that transparently deal with complaints.

Interventions
 * EDMO - "The European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) brings together fact-checkers, media literacy experts, and academic researchers to understand and analyse disinformation, in collaboration with media organisations, online platforms and media literacy practitioners."
 * (European Parliament on Twitter) Fact-checking tips.
 * (NATO 2021) "...in 2020, the United Nations launched the “Verified” campaign in the context of an influx of false and misleading information related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The initiative aims to deliver trusted information and counter disinformation about the health emergency (UN, 2020).
 * (NATO 2021) "Initially slow to respond to the disinformation threat and address the manipulation of their platforms for malicious purposes, social media companies have increasingly acknowledged the risk that it poses and recently adopted measures to address it (Polyakova and Fried, 2019). In the past few years, social media firms have made changes in their policies, oversight mechanisms, and operational parameters to reduce the spread of disinformation. ... Along with these structural changes, companies have increasingly adopted proactive measures, taking down or labelling content deemed misleading or false."
 * (NATO 2021) "Other civil society groups – and the citizens that form them – have been taking a more offensive approach to disinformation and propaganda by focusing on identifying, countering, and discrediting hostile narratives. For example, the ‘Baltic Elves’ are an internet activist network of thousands of volunteers based primarily in Lithuania who aim to counter false narratives spread by Russian media and online accounts across the Baltic states (Peel, 2019). In Ukraine, journalism students and professors established the fact-checking group StopFake in 2014 to debunk Russian hostile information activities. Since then, the group has been hired, along with more than 50 other organizations working in 40 different languages, by Facebook to curb the flow of hostile information on the platform (Troianovski, 2020). Other civil society groups include the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab and the Alliance for Securing Democracy’s Hamilton 68."
 * (KRRiT (nd)) (p.96-97) International journalistic self-regulation.
 * (KRRiT (nd) European Union
 * - "Jednym z elementów walki z dezinformacją, zapowiedzianym w Raporcie z wdrażania Komunikatu Komisji z kwietnia 2018 r., jest wsparcie dla utworzenia niezależnej europejskiej sieci weryfikatorów faktów."
 * - "W celu poprawy wykrywania i rozumienia różnych rodzajów zagrożeń dezinformacyjnych Komisja Europejska zapewniła sfinansowanie SOMA (Społecznego obserwatorium ds. dezinformacji i analizy mediów społecznych). Jednym z jego zadań jest stworzenie pilotażowej infrastruktury IT43 wspierającej fact-checking."
 * - "Komisja Europejska od 2013 r. finansuje działania w zakresie badań i innowacji ukierunkowanych na rozwój nowych technologii pomocnych w ocenie wiarygodności treści publikowanych w Internecie. Obecnie w ramach Europejskiej Rady ds. Badań Naukowych (ERBN – ERC) i programu „Horyzont 2020” podejmowanych jest szereg działań mających na celu poprawę zrozumienia dezinformacji internetowych i opracowanie nowych narzędzi weryfikacji treści. Projekty Comprop i Botfind badają, w jaki sposób zautomatyzowane systemy rozpowszechniania i ukierunkowywania propagandy wpływają na dyskurs publiczny w Europie. Projekt Debunker analizuje nieporozumienia wokół problemów społecznych w Europie i możliwe strategie ograniczania ich wpływu. Projekt Invid koncentruje się na opracowywaniu narzędzi do weryfikacji treści audiowizualnych. Inny projekt Horyzont 2020, Fandango, analizuje rozwiązania, które pomagają tradycyjnym mediom w lepszym wykrywaniu fałszywych narracji w Internecie. Najnowsze działania to: Eunomia (rozwiązanie open source do identyfikacji źródeł informacji), SocialTruth (rozproszony ekosystem umożliwiający łatwy dostęp do różnych usług weryfikacyjnych), Provenance (pośrednie bezpłatne rozwiązanie do weryfikacji treści cyfrowych)i WeVerify (wyzwania związane z weryfikacją treści dzięki weryfikacji uczestniczącej). Powyższe projekty adresowane są do społeczności aktywnych w walce z dezinformacją online."
 * - "Organizacje weryfikujące fakty pojawiają się w różnych krajach, często zrzeszając się w sieci ułatwiające współpracę, niekoniecznie pod auspicjami Komisji Europejskiej."


 * (Del Vicario, M. et al. (2018)) Framework to predict and recognize misinformation.
 * European Commission (2018a). Action Plan against Disinformation : The first hours after disinformation is released are critical for detecting, analysing and responding to it. Consequently, a Rapid Alert System will be set up to provide alerts on disinformation campaigns in real-time through a dedicated technological infrastructure. This will facilitate sharing of data and assessment, to enable common situational awareness, coordinated attribution and response and ensure time and resource efficiency.
 * (IFCN) "Founded back in late 2015, the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) has been advocating for higher standards among the global fact-checking community. To fulfill that purpose, a code of principles for fact-checkers has been developed and introduced to the community in 2016."
 * - IFCN’s Code of Principles Transparency Report for 2020


 * Collaborative fact-checking (Higgings, E. (2022) ) "... we’ve also seen what you might call truth-seeking communities emerge around specific issues. These are the internet users who want to inform themselves while guarding against manipulation by others, or being misled by their own preconceptions. Once established, they will not only share and propagate factchecks in a way that lends them credibility, but often conduct the process of factchecking themselves. What’s important about these communities is that they react quickly to information being put out by various actors, including states. ... I would go as far as to say that internet users who are heavily engaged with particular topics are our strongest defence against disinformation." See also: Maldita, Mutante.

Fact-Checking Impact Measurement

Assumptions -Bloomberg LP v. ZXC; Business activities may be seen as private activities - SLAPP in Banks vs Cadwalladr. (Cadwalladr on Twitter) "For the purposes of UK libel law, I am treated as a publisher. I bear the same risks as a news org just without an editor, legal team or insurance." In a follow-up Cadwalladr writes on Twitter: "The case rests on a single question: was it in the public interest for me, a journalist, to speak about a years-long investigation into Russian interference?"
 * (NATO 2021) "While each actor has its own strategy, means, and objectives, their individual efforts reinforce and amplify each other. This creates a densely interconnected - and at times overwhelming - information environment in which the distinction between fact and fiction is blurred. As such, disinformation and propaganda reduce the ability of citizens to access and agree on verified facts that should inform their participation in governance; contribute to increasing societal polarization and frustration with democracy; and negatively affect public confidence in electoral processes."
 * (Belgian Senate (2021) Shift in news consumption, from news to infotainment; less news diversity; social media as medium.
 * (McIntyre, L. (2018)) Antidote. David Redlawsk et al.: The affective tipping point. “...even the strongest partisans will eventually reach a “tipping point” and change their beliefs after they are continually exposed to corrective evidence.”
 * (McIntyre, L. (2018)) “We must always fight back against lies. We should never assume that any claim is “too outrageous to be believed.””
 * (McIntyre, L. (2018)) “... even in an era of partisan bloviating and noisy “skepticism,” the facts about reality can only be denied for so long.”
 * (McIntyre, L. (2018)) “... repetition of true facts does eventually have an effect.”
 * (McIntyre, L. (2018)) “... information provided in graphical form was more convincing than narratives.”
 * (Renee DiResta on Twitter) "Fact-checks became a partisan battleground long ago, particularly around politics & vaccines (increasingly political). Belief that “fact-checkers are biased” or “bought” means they can be dismissed, mocked as part of a media consensus machine."
 * (Ecker, U. et al. (2022)) "For decades, science communication has relied on an information deficit model when responding to misinformation, focusing on people’s misunderstanding of, or lack of access to, facts. Thus, a thorough and accessible explanation of facts should overcome the impact of misinformation. However, the information deficit model ignores the cognitive, social and affective drivers of attitude formation and truth judgements."
 * (Ecker, U. et al. (2022)) "Numerous best practices for debunking have emerged. First, the most important element of a debunking correction is to provide a factual account that ideally includes an alternative explanation for why something happened. ... Second, the misinformation should be repeated to demonstrate how it is incorrect and to make the correction salient. ... Third, even though credibility matters less for correction sources compared with misinformation sources, corrections are ideally delivered by or associated with high-credibility sources. There is also emerging evidence that corrections are more impactful when they come from a socially connected source (for example, a connection on social media) rather than a stranger ... Fourth, corrections should be paired with relevant social norms, including injunctive norms (‘protecting the vulnerable by getting vaccinated is the right thing to do’) and descriptive norms (‘over 90% of parents are vaccinating their children’), as well as expert consensus (‘doctors and medical societies around the world agree that vaccinations are important and safe’) ... Fifth, the language used in a correction is important. Simple language and informative graphics can facilitate knowledge revision, especially if fact comprehension might be otherwise difficult or if the person receiving the correction has a strong tendency to counterargue. When speaking directly to misinformed individuals, empathic communication should be used rather than wielding expertise to argue directives ... Finally, it has been suggested that worldview-threatening corrections can be made more palatable by concurrently providing an identity affirmation".
 * (Ecker, U. et al. (2022)) "Social media corrections are effective when they come from algorithmic sources, from expert organizations such as a government health agency or from multiple other users on social media".
 * (European Union) Statistics on individuals who have checked the truthfulness of information
 * Global public net level of trust for journalists is down 10% in 2021.
 * KRRiT (nd) "Eksperci rynku są zgodni co do tego, że w walce ze zjawiskiem dezinformacji kluczowe jest wspieranie wysokiej jakości dziennikarstwa i pluralistycznych mediów informacyjnych, a także edukacja, rozwijanie umiejętności krytycznego myślenia i kompetencji cyfrowych, w szczególności wśród młodych ludzi."
 * Investigative journalism in the UK is under legal threat by those reported upon:
 * (Higgings, E. (2022) ) "Social media has played a particularly significant role in the spread of disinformation. Malicious state enterprises such as the notorious Russian “troll farm” are part of this, certainly. But there is a more powerful mechanism: the way it brings together people, whether flat earthers or anti-vaxxers, who would find it difficult to meet like-minded folks in the real world. ... Why do counterfactual communities form? A key factor is distrust in mainstream authority. ... One way of looking at this is that government deception or hypocrisy has caused a form of moral injury. As with the proverb “once bitten, twice shy”, that injury can result in a kneejerk rejection of anyone perceived as being on the side of the establishment. This creates a problem for traditional approaches to combatting disinformation, such as the top-down factcheck, which might be provided by a mainstream media outlet or some other organisation. More often than not, this will be discredited, dismissed with: “They would say that, wouldn’t they?” Factchecking outfits may do good work, but they are missing a crucial component: the power of the crowd."

Recommendations
 * (NATO 2021) "Allied governments should cooperate with news organizations to call out disinformation. They should particularly support the development of fact-checking tools. Similarly, following the example set by some Allied countries such as Latvia, they should encourage and invest in professional investigative journalism, including at local levels, to offer high-quality alternatives to disinformation. They should also ensure that national political contexts do not inhibit the practice of free and independent journalism. They should reinforce screening processes for foreign investments in media organizations to prevent authoritarian states from gaining influence in the information space and leveraging it to spread disinformation and propaganda. Finally, they should continue to support the work of international public service media in exposing and countering disinformation and propaganda."
 * (NATO 2021) "Allied countries should develop online tools to debunk election-related disinformation. They could, for instance, replicate the best practice developed by the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency for the 2020 elections with the creation of the rumorcontrol website dedicated to independently debunking false claims about the integrity of the elections."
 * (NATO 2021) "Allied governments should cooperate with news organizations to call out disinformation. They should particularly support the development of fact-checking tools."
 * (The Royal Society (2022)) "To support the UK’s nascent fact-checking sector, programmes which foster independence and financial sustainability are necessary. To help address complex scientific misinformation content and ‘information deserts’, fact checkers could highlight areas of growing scepticism or dispute, for deeper consideration by organisations with strong records in carrying out evidence reviews, such as the UK’s national academies and learned societies."
 * Belgian Senate (2021)
 * - "De Senaat beveelt aan om actiever in te zetten op regulering en zelfregulering, het bevorderen van correcte informatie en het aanmoedigen van de ontwikkeling van tools voor de verificatie van informatie."
 * - "De Senaat beveelt aan erover te waken dat er voldoende pluraliteit is binnen het medialandschap, zowel bij de klassieke als de digitale media."
 * - "De Senaat beveelt aan de wet van 30 december 1963 betreffende de erkenning en de bescherming van de titel van beroepsjournalist aan te passen aan de huidige context, door de herwaardering van de beroepsjournalistiek en van de faciliteiten die zij krijgen."
 * - "De Senaat beveelt aan om, samen met de mediasector, initiatieven ter ondersteuning van de kwaliteitsjournalistiek te helpen promoten en ondersteunen."
 * - "De Senaat beveelt aan dat de basisopleiding van de communicatieprofessionals de nadruk zou leggen op de journalistieke deontologie en de bronnenkritiek en factchecktools zou omvatten."
 * - "De Senaat beveelt aan om factchecking en onderzoeksjournalistiek, van zowel private als publieke media, actief te ondersteunen."
 * - "De Senaat beveelt aan technologische instrumenten voor factchecking te verbeteren."
 * - "De Senaat beveelt aan op Europees niveau op grotere schaal te factchecken, in alle EU-landen en talen.''
 * - "De Senaat beveelt aan om de bestaande factcheckinginitiatieven in ons land beter op elkaar af te stemmen en hun samenwerking te versterken."
 * -"De Senaat beveelt aan om nieuwsberichten van media die lid zijn van een erkend, zelfregulerend orgaan (zoals de Raad voor Journalistiek), een label te geven op socialemediaplatformen. Zo heeft de gebruiker de zekerheid dat het bericht voldoet aan alle eisen van onafhankelijke en waarheidsgetrouwe journalistiek."

Fact-Checking projects

Journalism projects