NATO 2021

COMMITTEE ON DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY (CDS) - BOLSTERING THE DEMOCRATIC RESILIENCE OF THE ALLIANCE AGAINST DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA. Special Report. Linda SANCHEZ (United States) Special Rapporteur. 013 CDS 21 E rev. 2 fin | Original: English | 10 October 2021

URL: https://www.nato-pa.int/document/2021-bolstering-democratic-resilienceof-alliance-against-disinformation-and-propaganda


 * (1) Disinformation and propaganda do not spread in a vacuum. Rather, they thrive when democratic erosion intensifies, societal divisions rise, and public trust in traditional media and other recognized sources of expertise and verified information declines. Allied societies have increasingly been grappling with these challenges in recent years. The interaction between such democratic vulnerabilities, on the one hand, and disinformation and propaganda, on the other, creates a mutually reinforcing feedback loop. External and domestic malign actors exploit existing weaknesses to widen divisions in Allied societies, generating additional vulnerabilities in the process. They are not only pursuing their own strategic goals through their hostile information activities, but also attempting to undermine the democratic values, principles, and processes that form the foundations of liberal societies and of the Alliance.
 * A growing number of actors is involved in the dissemination of disinformation and propaganda. Most are exogenous, some – perhaps even more worryingly – are, however, endogenous. They include authoritarian states like Russia, China, and Iran which engage in hostile information activities to generate and inflame tensions in Allied democracies, and to promote their repressive governance models abroad. Some non-state actors, including terrorist organizations, far right and conspiracy theory movements, and informal groups motivated by monetary gain are developing sophisticated disinformation and propaganda capabilities. These actors harness evolving technologies – on which Allied societies rely – to further enhance their capacity to spread harmful narratives. The latter are disseminated primarily by individual citizens within our borders, either purposefully or unwittingly.
 * While each actor has its own strategy, means, and objectives, their individual efforts reinforce and amplify each other. This creates a densely interconnected - and at times overwhelming - information environment in which the distinction between fact and fiction is blurred. As such, disinformation and propaganda reduce the ability of citizens to access and agree on verified facts that should inform their participation in governance; contribute to increasing societal polarization and frustration with democracy; and negatively affect public confidence in electoral processes.
 * In the past decades, the development of modern means of communication has made the information landscape increasingly complex. It is no longer the preserve of a select few actors such as states and traditional media. Rather, it favors many-to-many interactions between individuals who generate a large proportion of the content themselves. ...
 * (3-4) The opening-up of the online information space has, however, been exploited by opportunistic actors to spread disinformation and propaganda faster and further than ever before. They take advantage of several vulnerabilities intrinsic to the nature of the online domain. First, by facilitating the creation and dissemination of information, online tools allow for a multiplication of sources. Although theoretically positive, this proliferation can overwhelm the public and make it difficult to assess the credibility of those sources and, therefore, to gauge the reliability of the information received (NATO Strategic Communications, 2016; Lazer et al., 2017). Second, although crucial to free speech, the anonymity of the online space allows ill-intentioned actors to spread harmful falsehoods covertly and effortlessly without taking responsibility for their effects (Cordy, 2017; Bremmer, 2010). Third, the algorithms that power social media platforms inadvertently contribute to the dissemination of disinformation and propaganda by confining users into homogeneous “echo chambers”.
 * (4) The COVID-19 pandemic magnified the impact of the misuse of technological tools on the dissemination of disinformation and propaganda in the information space.
 * In the future, emerging technologies have the potential to further intensify the creation, spread, and impact of disinformation and propaganda.
 * (5) The proliferation of propaganda and disinformation poses multiple threats to the democratic resilience of Allied societies. First, by blurring the line between fact and fiction, disinformation and propaganda undermine the public’s confidence in reliable sources of information. As such, they threaten one of the pillars of democracy: the ability of citizens to access verified information on which they can base their active participation in governance. Indeed, the growing propagation of disinformation and propaganda in recent years has led to a decrease in public trust in traditional journalism and the mainstream media.
 * (6) Second, disinformation and propaganda contribute to heightening the polarization of Allied societies and increasing dissatisfaction with democracy. Both domestic and external ill-intentioned actors spread partisan disinformation that specifically aims to widen the already existing political divides between citizens within democratic societies (Niu et al., 2020). Even when it is not partisan in nature, as it floods the information space, disinformation generates a sense of confusion and information exhaustion amongst citizens. The latter therefore often tune out perspectives that do not comport with their own and rely exclusively on a limited number of sources that correspond to their views (Tavernise and Gardiner, 2019). As a result, citizens can no longer agree on basic facts, thus threatening the democratic fabric of our societies.
 * (7) Third, disinformation and propaganda affect public trust and participation in elections.
 * (7-11) Actors involved: Russia, China, authoritarian states like Iran, non-state groups.
 * (11) Disinformation and propaganda, even when created by malicious exogenous actors, ultimately spread largely through the actions of individual citizens within our borders. In that sense, citizens are both the primary targets and the main promoters of false information.


 * (15) The EU’s approach to countering disinformation and propaganda involves several dedicated initiatives and instruments. In 2015, the European External Action Service (EEAS) set up its East Strategic Communications Task Force to tackle Russian disinformation campaigns against the EU and its member states. In 2018, the European Commission launched a voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation to which the largest social media companies agreed. The same year, it adopted an Action Plan against Disinformation, a key feature of which was the launch of a Rapid Alert System (RAS) to monitor and uncover disinformation and propaganda campaigns in real time (European Commission, 2021). In December 2020, the Commission introduced the European Democracy Action Plan which seeks to strengthen media freedom and counter disinformation in the context of elections (European Commission, 2020).
 * (15-16) The EU is a key partner for NATO in countering threats in the information space. Allied leaders emphasized the strength and value of this cooperation in their June 2021 communiqué by stating that “the current strategic environment and the COVID pandemic underscore the importance of NATO-EU cooperation in the face of current and evolving security challenges”, including disinformation. Both organizations have strengthened their joint efforts in recent years to tackle disinformation within the wider context of their response to hybrid threats. Interactions have focused on increasing staff-to-staff information exchange, improving capacities related to analysis of disinformation, coordinating messaging, and reinforcing mutual alert capacities to detect hostile information activities, for example through the RAS mechanism in which NATO participates (EU-NATO, 2020). The cooperation between the EU and NATO in this area has been complemented by the establishment in 2017 of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, which provides a forum for strategic discussions and joint training exercises among the NATO Allies and EU Member States involved.


 * Other initiatives have been undertaken to counter disinformation such as the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism which aims to strengthen coordination across the G7 countries in identifying, preventing, and responding to evolving threats to democracies. Similarly, in 2020, the United Nations launched the “Verified” campaign in the context of an influx of false and misleading information related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The initiative aims to deliver trusted information and counter disinformation about the health emergency (UN, 2020).


 * (14) NATO … provides support to member states in thwarting threats in the information space. For instance, it is currently developing a counter-hostile information and disinformation toolbox for Allies outlining key definitions, approaches, and response options. Once finalized, the toolbox will aim to facilitate the sharing among Allies of lessons learned and, where possible, the replication of national best practices. In addition, in 2018, Allied countries established NATO Counter-Hybrid Support Teams, i.e., groups of experts that can provide tailored assistance to member states, upon their request, on an ad hoc basis in preparing for, and responding to, hybrid activities, including disinformation and propaganda (NATO, 2019).


 * (13) Paragraph 37
 * Recommendations:
 * (19) individual member states should translate the collective recommitment to the democratic values and principles that underpin the Alliance contained in the June 2021 communiqué into concrete actions at the national level. In particular, member countries should reassert their commitment to women’s equal rights and dedicate additional resources to understanding and countering the effects of gendered disinformation on our democracies.
 * Member states should foster public trust in the integrity of electoral processes which constitute the basis of our democratic systems. To that end, they could consider developing a shared framework on the protection of elections against disinformation and propaganda. This framework should include common standards on strategic communications around elections, specific media regulations, and eventual sanctions against disruptive actors.
 * Allied countries should cooperate to develop a common transatlantic legislative approach on regulating online content with a view to prevent the dissemination of disinformation and propaganda. Large technological companies should not be placed in a position to make unilateral decisions on the acceptability or veracity of content. Rather, such issues should be addressed through a strong legislative framework that would be transparent and democratic in nature and would both guarantee freedom of speech and prevent online hostile information activities. This framework should aim to replace currently competing national efforts with a common approach to managing the use of information technologies, including emerging technologies such as AI and deepfakes. Beyond preventing the misuse of information tools, this framework should also support a positive vision of digital technology as a democratic tool.


 * Providing a toolbox – see elsewhere
 * Fact-based communication – see elsewhere
 * (15) Although NATO has already stepped up its efforts to counter disinformation and propaganda in the past few years, it must continue to intensify its work in this area. The Rapporteur fully endorses the commitment made by Allied Heads of State and government at the NATO Summit in June 2021 to continue enhancing situational awareness and expanding the tools to counter hybrid threats, including disinformation campaigns, by developing comprehensive preventive and response options. She also welcomes the adoption by Allied leaders of a Strengthened Resilience Commitment in which they emphasize the growing threat posed by hostile information activities, pledge to bolster NATO’s public communication, and acknowledge the need to adopt a whole-of-society approach to strengthening resilience.
 * Recommendations:
 * (21) Increase NATO’s capacity to understand and respond to threats in the information space
 * (22) Create a framework that places democratic resilience and efforts to counter disinformation and propaganda at the center of NATO’s future
 * (23) Better coordinate with other stakeholders facing the same threat


 * (16) Initially slow to respond to the disinformation threat and address the manipulation of their platforms for malicious purposes, social media companies have increasingly acknowledged the risk that it poses and recently adopted measures to address it (Polyakova and Fried, 2019). In the past few years, social media firms have made changes in their policies, oversight mechanisms, and operational parameters to reduce the spread of disinformation. ... Along with these structural changes, companies have increasingly adopted proactive measures, taking down or labelling content deemed misleading or false.
 * However, the actions of social media companies do not represent a panacea to the problem of disinformation. Limited legislative and governmental regulation and intervention on these platforms have left it up to companies to create their own guidelines. This state of play is unsatisfactory and needs careful rethinking for two main reasons. First, self-regulation has not always been effective in eliminating false content or preventing hostile actors from disseminating misleading and divisive content (Berzina et al, 2019). Second, leaving social media companies solely responsible for tackling disinformation raises concerns about corporate censorship, politicization of the platforms, and lack of transparency. The boundary between disinformation on the one hand, and freedom of speech on the other must therefore be set through a democratic process and not be left to the discretion of private entities. In collaboration with the private sector and civil society, democratic governments should work towards achieving a shared understanding of the threat posed by online disinformation and set common standards on how to tackle it, while at the same time protecting freedom of speech.
 * Recommendation:
 * Allied countries should cooperate with digital companies in a more informal manner to develop a democratic digital domain in which freedom of speech is upheld and disinformation prevented from spreading. This cooperation should focus on four key aspects. First, Allied countries and digital companies should assess the impact of the measures that the latter have recently adopted, particularly around the 2020 US election, and replicate successful practices where appropriate. Second, Allied governments should urge these companies to invest in technologies, such as algorithms, that can automatically identify disinformation and flag it for users. Third, they should press digital companies to strengthen online accountability by bolstering their policies against users posting under false names. Finally, governments should work with these companies to take down authoritarian state-sponsored news outlets and social media accounts disseminating disinformation and propaganda.


 * (13) Paragraph 38
 * (18) Other civil society groups – and the citizens that form them – have been taking a more offensive approach to disinformation and propaganda by focusing on identifying, countering, and discrediting hostile narratives. For example, the ‘Baltic Elves’ are an internet activist network of thousands of volunteers based primarily in Lithuania who aim to counter false narratives spread by Russian media and online accounts across the Baltic states (Peel, 2019). In Ukraine, journalism students and professors established the fact-checking group StopFake in 2014 to debunk Russian hostile information activities. Since then, the group has been hired, along with more than 50 other organizations working in 40 different languages, by Facebook to curb the flow of hostile information on the platform (Troianovski, 2020). Other civil society groups include the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab and the Alliance for Securing Democracy’s Hamilton 68.
 * Recommendation
 * (19) Allied countries should develop online tools to debunk election-related disinformation. They could, for instance, replicate the best practice developed by the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency for the 2020 elections with the creation of the rumorcontrol website dedicated to independently debunking false claims about the integrity of the elections.
 * (20) Allied governments should cooperate with news organizations to call out disinformation. They should particularly support the development of fact-checking tools.


 * Recommendation
 * (20) Allied governments should cooperate with news organizations to call out disinformation. They should particularly support the development of fact-checking tools. Similarly, following the example set by some Allied countries such as Latvia, they should encourage and invest in professional investigative journalism, including at local levels, to offer high-quality alternatives to disinformation. They should also ensure that national political contexts do not inhibit the practice of free and independent journalism. They should reinforce screening processes for foreign investments in media organizations to prevent authoritarian states from gaining influence in the information space and leveraging it to spread disinformation and propaganda. Finally, they should continue to support the work of international public service media in exposing and countering disinformation and propaganda.


 * Citizens are both the primary catalyst in the dissemination of disinformation and propaganda and the first line of defense against these threats. For that reason, both raising awareness about hostile information activities and helping individuals to identify and reject false or misleading content are critical. To that end, some civil society groups have been supporting and complementing the abovementioned institutional digital and media literacy campaigns. For instance, in the implementation of its “Strategy for a strong democracy” which it adopted in 2018, the Swedish government has been relying heavily on civil society organizations. They carry out digital and media literacy campaigns with the aim of reinforcing societal resilience to disinformation, propaganda, and hate speech online while safeguarding freedom of speech (Swedish Government, 2018).
 * Recommendations:
 * (20) Member states should also work with civil society organizations specialized in the development of programs and curricula on enhancing media literacy. These actors are often well-placed to bridge the trust gap between citizens and traditional media. Governments should also support the creation by such organizations of counter-disinformation websites similar to the Estonian website propastop or the Ukrainian website StopFake.
 * Allied countries should support efforts to raise media literacy levels among youth. In particular, they should follow the example of partner countries such as Finland and ensure that educational institutions raise awareness among children from a young age about the distinction between information and disinformation. Where possible, they should replicate best practices developed by other NATO states and partner countries.


 * (14) NATO’s response to hostile information activities follows a twin-track model. First, it aims to understand the information environment in which it operates. To that end, it tracks, monitors, and analyses information threats, including disinformation and propaganda campaigns. Second, it embeds these insights into its communication efforts, thus enabling NATO to tailor its strategic communications to counter disinformation most effectively. A third principle underpins NATO’s strategy against disinformation: coordination. NATO strives to synchronize its efforts internally and closely cooperates with external actors that face the same threats, such as partner countries, the EU, and the private sector (NATO, 2020).
 * NATO does not respond to propaganda with propaganda. Proactive, fact-based, credible communications are the best means at its disposal to counter hostile information activities. NATO uses a range of tools to refute false claims and expose disinformation aimed at the Alliance, including media statements, press briefings, debunking, and fact checking.


 * (14) Paragraph 39
 * Recommendation:
 * (19) Member countries should also further communicate to their national publics the importance of the Alliance’s common values and the need to uphold and defend them. In today’s complex information environment, endogenous and exogenous threats are difficult to disentangle and efforts to protect our democracies must therefore start in the domestic space. Strengthening internal societal cohesion around democratic values and institutions is particularly essential to rebuff the claims of authoritarian actors extolling the supposed superiority of their regimes.